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Gas supply interruptions, increasing gas prices, transportation and distribution 
bottlenecks, and a growing reliance on imports over longer distances have renewed 
interest on gas vulnerability in Asia. Japan, Korea and Taiwan are heavily reliant on LNG 
imports for their gas supplies from Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Australia and the Middle 
East. Countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore import gas via trans-border 
pipelines. This paper examines the relative vulnerability of eight gas-importing countries 
in Asia for the year 2006 using four market risk indicators (ratio of value of gas imports 
to GDP; ratio of gas consumed to GDP; ratio of gas consumed in an economy to 
population; and ratio of gas consumption to total primary energy consumption) and two 
supply risk indicators (ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas 
consumption and geopolitical risk). Using principal component analysis, a composite 
index of gas vulnerability is estimated by combining the individual indicators. The results 
demonstrate that there are significant differences in the values of individual and overall 
indicators of gas vulnerability among countries. Two individual indicators— ratio of 
value of gas imports to GDP and ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas 
consumption were more significant than the others in influencing the overall gas 
vulnerability results. 
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Natural gas has become an increasingly valuable resource. Its consumption is expected to 
increase into the future because of its low environmental impact, ease of use and an 
increase in the number of natural gas-fired power plants. It is one of the fuels that drive 
the economy. The demand for it, as a replacement for more expensive, less 
environmentally-friendly and less efficient resources, has significantly increased. The 
world is dependent on natural gas for power generation. In 2006, it fulfilled more than 23 
per cent of the total global primary energy demand (BP, 2007). OECD countries 
accounted for 52 per cent of gas use, transition economies, especially Russia, used about 
23 per cent with developing countries accounting for the rest. Natural gas is forecast to be 
the fastest growing energy source by 2025, with global consumption rising by almost 70 
per cent from 92 trillion cubic feet to 156 trillion cubic feet. The emerging markets of 
Asia will be the centre of this growth where gas consumption is projected to triple by 
2025 (EIA, 2005).  
 
Natural gas is also becoming an increasingly global commodity. In the past, gas has 
tended to be used in the region where it is produced because of the relatively high 
transport costs. However, technical developments have led to a drastic reduction in gas 
liquefaction and transport costs making liquefied natural gas (LNG) competitive with 
traditional pipeline gas. The rapid growth in LNG use and its greater flexibility is already 
beginning to create a global market for gas. In 2006, approximately 26 per cent of the 
global natural gas supply was internationally traded with LNG shipments showing strong 
growth, well above the ten-year average and making up more than 28 per cent of total 
export volume (IEA, 2007a). The remaining share of gas sold on the world energy market 
is distributed via gas pipelines. The imbalances between supply and demand drive 
international trade in natural gas. On the one hand are northeast Asian countries (i.e. 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China), which holds less than 2 per cent of world’s reserves 
but account for almost 7 per cent of the demand. On the other hand, the Middle East 
(particularly Iran and Qatar) and Russia have two-thirds of the world’s reserves and 
account for around 25 per cent of the demand in 2006 (BP, 2007). 
 
The international gas trade has three major markets: North America, Europe and Asia-
Pacific. Selling and distribution conditions vary greatly from one market to the other. 
North America has been largely self-sufficient, with Canada being an important exporter 
of natural gas to the United States. The United States imported 19 per cent of its gas 
requirements in 2006, mainly from Canada via gas pipelines. North American gas 
reserves are rapidly declining, and as a result, the United States has increasingly imported 
LNG from the Arab-Persian Gulf and Africa. American domestic production is supplied 
by 6,800 producers, including 21 major suppliers. It is a very fragmented and competitive 
market where gas is negotiated through spot contracts and medium-term contracts of 1 or 
2 years which are index-linked to spot prices. The European gas market relied for almost 
40 per cent of its gas requirements on imports from Russia, Algeria and Norway through 
pipeline and LNG in 2006. Imported gas exchanges are based on long term contracts of 
20 to 25 years and indexation clauses where the gas price is directly linked to the price of 
crude oil, including relatively strict clauses such as take-or-pay clauses which require 
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importers to pay for the gas even if their deliveries are interrupted. In the Asia-Pacific, 
gas market requirements are met through imports of LNG from Malaysia, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Australia and the Middle East. Japan and Korea are almost entirely dependent 
on LNG imports for their gas supplies. Gas prices are linked to oil in Japan and Korea, 
but with a formula that differs from that of European gas users. In Australia and New 
Zealand, prices are set by gas-on-gas or gas-on-coal competition (IAEE, 2007; IEA, 
2007a; BP 2007). 
 
Gas supply interruptions, increasing gas prices, transportation and distribution 
bottlenecks, and a growing reliance on imports over longer distances have rekindled a 
debate on gas vulnerability. Gas-importing countries have started to examine available 
responses to short- and medium-term disruptions. A number of studies (Gupta, 2008; 
APERC, 2007; UNDP, 2007) have examined the relative oil vulnerability of oil-
importing countries on the basis of various factors but none on gas vulnerability of gas-
importing countries in Asia. 
 
The objective of this paper is to quantify and assess the relative gas vulnerability of eight 
gas-importing countries in Asia for the year 2006 on the basis of four market risk 
indicators — (1) ratio of value of gas imports to gross domestic product (GDP), (2) gas 
consumption per unit of GDP, (3) gas consumption per capita and (4) gas share in total 
primary energy demand; and two supply risk indicators — (1) ratio of domestic gas 
production to gas consumption, and (2) exposure to political risk as measured by 
diversification of supply sources and political stability risk in gas–supplying countries. 
The eight net gas-importing countries included in this study are Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
China, India, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, which together account for more than 60 
per cent of the total gas consumption in the Asia–Pacific in 2006 (BP, 2007). 
 
The composite gas vulnerability index (GVI) is computed using a multivariate technique 
of principal component analysis (PCA). The various indicators of gas vulnerability are 
interrelated and that the GVI derived using PCA provides a composite quantitative 
measure of gas vulnerability by taking into account the interactions and interdependence 
between the identified set of indicators. The GVI captures the sensitivity of the Asian 
economies to developments in the international gas market, with a higher index 
indicating higher vulnerability. Unlike conventional methods of index construction, the 
PCA does not assign subjective ad hoc weights to the indicators. The weights are the 
result of multivariate statistical analysis of the proposed indicators (Gupta, 2008; Nagar 
and Basu, 2002).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the current state of the natural gas 
market in the eight selected Asian countries. A description of the vulnerability indicators 
and data sources are provided in Section 3. Section 4 derives the GVI using the principal 
component technique. Thereafter, Section 5 presents our results on vulnerability based on 





2. THE NATURAL GAS MARKETS IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan use natural gas primarily for power generation purposes. They 
have been pioneers in the use of gas to fuel large power plants. None of these economies 
has significant domestic natural gas reserves, and gas is imported in the form of LNG 
(APEC, 2006).  
 
Japan’s demand for natural gas has been increasing rapidly at an average annual growth 
rate of 4.8 per cent between 1980 and 2006. In 2006, Japan imported 96 per cent of its 
gas requirements and domestic demand was met almost entirely by LNG. LNG imports 
into Japan comprised 39 per cent of total world LNG trade, which mostly come from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Australia. Natural gas is mainly used for 
electricity generation, reticulated city gas and industrial fuels. Since Japan has placed 
priority on the stable and secure supply of LNG, Japanese LNG buyers have been in 
general paying a higher price than buyers in Europe or the United States under the long-
term take or pay contracts with rigid terms on volume and price. Japan lacks a national 
pipeline network which could interconnect its consuming areas. The possibility of a 
significant disruption at one LNG terminal in Japan poses a potential supply vulnerability 
issue. 
 
To reduce the economy’s dependence on imported oil, Korea introduced LNG in the 
1980s to power its natural gas-based city gas to the residential sector. Since then, natural 
gas use has grown rapidly. Korea relies on imported LNG for most of its natural gas, 
though it began producing a small quantity of natural gas from one offshore field in 2004. 
Korea is the second largest importer of LNG worldwide accounting for 16 per cent of 
total imports in 2006. The bulk of Korea’s LNG imports come from Qatar, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Oman, with smaller volumes coming from Egypt, Brunei Darussalam and 
Australia, and occasional spot cargoes from elsewhere. Korean natural gas demand is 
shared almost evenly between the electricity sector and the residential heating sector, 
with a smaller amount consumed in petrochemical plants. With demand growing at an 
average annual growth rate of 35 per cent between 2003 and 2006, Korea continues to 
sign contracts for additional supplies, though most of the new LNG term contracts in the 
past few years have included more flexibility for the purchaser in terms of the ability to 
lower volumes if necessary. To ensure stable supply for gas, Korea is also increasing 
LNG storage capacity at its existing terminals (EIA, 2007a). 
 
Taiwan has very limited domestic energy resources and relies on imports for most of its 
energy requirements. There is no coal and oil reserves and natural gas resources are 
limited at around 7.7 billion cubic metres. In 2006, Taiwan had to import around 98 per 
cent of its energy requirements. Domestic demand for natural gas was met almost entirely 
by LNG imports, which mostly come from Indonesia and Malaysia. Taiwan also receives 
small amounts of LNG imports from Nigeria, Oman, Egypt and Australia. To facilitate 
supply and expand the use of natural gas, Taiwan has completed transmission and 
distribution network along the country’s west coast, which includes main trunk pipeline 
and regional distribution stations. To diversify its LNG supply, Taiwan has signed a 25-
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year LNG purchase agreement with RasGas of Qatar and has been constructing a new 
LNG import terminal in Taichung to expand import capacity (IEA, 2007a; EIA, 2007b).  
 
China is rich in energy resources, particularly coal. For power generation and industrial 
development purposes, coal and oil resources have been utilised more extensively than 
natural gas. Natural gas is primarily used as a feed stock for chemical fertiliser and to 
operate oil and gas fields. China’s major gas fields are located in the western part of the 
country, making transport to eastern demand centres difficult. Gas use in China is still 
small but is expected to double by 2030 (Komiyama, Zhidong and Ito, 2005; APERC, 
2008). This growth will be driven mainly by the increased use of gas for power 
generation and increased residential consumption in urban areas. While some of the 
rising demand will be fulfilled through increases in domestic production, a large portion 
will come from pipeline and LNG imports. China received its first-ever LNG cargo in 
mid-2006 under a long-term contract with Australia. Its second terminal in Fujian is due 
to start receiving cargoes from Indonesia in 2008. Another regasification terminal in the 
Shanghai area will import LNG from Malaysia by 2009. In the northern inland areas of 
China, natural gas supply is likely to come from Siberia, Turkmenistan, Sakhalin and 
Sakha.  
 
In India, natural gas represents less than 9 per cent of total primary energy demand. Like 
China, India rely more on coal for power generation. However, India’s current 
consumption of natural gas has risen faster than any other fuel. The power and fertiliser 
industries are the key demand drivers for natural gas. Despite major new natural gas 
discoveries in recent years, India’s domestic natural gas supply is not likely to keep pace 
with demand, and the country will have to import either via pipeline or as LNG. The bulk 
of India’s natural gas production comes from the western offshore regions, especially the 
Mumbai High basin. The onshore fields in Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Gujarat states are 
also major producers of natural gas. In 2006, around 20 per cent of supply came from 
imported LNG. Currently, there are two regasification terminals located on the Western 
coast of India, Dahej and Hazira. The Dahej terminal is being supplied from Qatar under 
a long term contract, supplemented by spot cargoes from other sources. A possible source 
of supply for Hazira terminal is Australia’s Gorgon LNG project. By 2010, India intends 
to have two more import terminals, Dabhol — Ratnagiri and Kochi. A contractual 
agreement on the pricing formula for gas has been signed and plans to import gas through 
the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline have progressed. Other possible sources of imported gas 
are Bangladesh and Burma. The natural gas reserves of Bangladesh could be linked into 
the Indian gas grid while new natural gas find in Burma could be supplied via pipeline 
running across Bangladeshi territory to West Bengal in India provided agreement could 
be reached among parties concerned (EIA, 2008).  
 
In 2006, natural gas accounted for almost 12 per cent of Singapore’s total primary energy 
demand. Singapore relies entirely on imports to meet its natural gas requirements which 
are mainly used for power generation and petrochemical production. Around three 
quarters of Singapore’s fuel demand for electricity production come from natural gas. 
With gas representing such a large share of electricity production, diversification of 
supply is an important issue. Currently, all of Singapore’s piped natural gas imports come 
from Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the Energy Market Authority of Singapore is 
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currently studying the viability of building an LNG import terminal, thereby freeing itself 
from dependence on neighbouring states for its natural gas supply. An agreement was 
also signed to supply LNG to the import terminal on Singapore's Jurong Island by 2012. 
 
Malaysia is well endowed with conventional energy resources such as oil, gas and coal, 
along with renewables such as hydro, biomass and solar energy. Natural gas production 
has been rising steadily, with the Malaysia – Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) 
being the most recent, although relatively small area for gas exploration and 
development. Malaysia also has the world’s largest liquefaction centre in a single 
location, Bintulu LNG. Malaysia is Southeast Asia’s second largest exporter of LNG, 
after Indonesia. Its major markets for its LNG exports are Japan, Korea and Taiwan while 
a small percentage of gas is exported to Singapore by pipeline. Domestically, gas is used 
as fuel for electricity generation as well as feedstock in the petrochemicals industry. In 
2006, natural gas accounted for more than 54 per cent of Malaysia’s total primary energy 
demand. Surprisingly, Malaysia is also an importer of gas from Indonesia. In 2007, gas 
imports represent 23 per cent of total gas supplies through the Peninsular Gas Utilisation 
(PGU) pipeline network (APERC, 2008). 
 
Thailand is endowed with reserves of natural gas, about 94 per cent of which is found in 
the Gulf of Thailand. Supply sources of natural gas are both from domestic fields and 
piped imports from Myanmar, though LNG remains a long-term option for Thailand. 
Imports of LNG have been confirmed with the planned construction of a receiving 
terminal on the east coast of the country by 2011, with supply coming from Iran. 
Additional supply of natural gas is also expected from the Malaysia – Thailand Joint 
Development Area (JDA) (EIA, 2007c). 
 
3. Gas vulnerability and its indicators 
The oil shocks in the 1970s demonstrated how vulnerable the world’s economy was to 
supply interruptions and price volatility. Any energy infrastructure, oil, coal or natural 
gas, is often vulnerable to disruption by insufficient supply, accident or malice. 
Terrorism, technical mishap, or natural disasters that damage the energy system could be 
nearly as devastating as a sizeable war. Inadequate financial resources also increase 
vulnerability by limiting supply, transmission, and reliability. Today, vulnerability has 
both economic and environmental components. Economically, expensive energy imports 
adversely affect the macroeconomic balance of payments, contribute inflationary 
pressures, and displace other consumption and investment because short-term demand is 
inelastic. Environmentally, most fossil fuels impose regional air pollution burdens and 
costs related to climate change and global warming (Andrews, 2005). 
 
To date, the literature on energy vulnerability has concentrated on oil vulnerability of oil-
consuming countries (Gupta, 2008; APERC, 2008; UNDP, 2007). Following the 
literature on oil vulnerability, this paper highlights two major risks that contribute to the 
overall gas vulnerability of an economy—market (or economic risk) and supply risk. 
Market risk of an economy refers to the risk of macroeconomic effects due to shortage of 
gas supply and price changes in gas markets while supply risk refers to risks of physical 
disruptions in gas supplies. 
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Exposure to market risks such as increase in inflation and unemployment and adverse 
effects on balance of payments of higher gas prices make economies vulnerable. 
However, the degree of impact depends on the share in national income of the cost of gas, 
degree of dependence on imported gas, gas consumption per unit of gross domestic 
product (GDP), share of gas in energy supply and strategic gas reserves. High import bills 
relative to GDP or high gas intensity of GDP result in larger macroeconomic adjustments 
costs and hence larger economic effect. In addition, the higher the share of gas in total 
energy supply the more vulnerable an economy is to international gas developments. 
However, the larger gas reserves or domestic production capabilities a country has, the 
lesser are the likely macroeconomic impacts. 
 
Exposure to supply risks such as insufficient supply due to dwindling domestic reserves 
and production or supply disruption due to geopolitical insecurities contributes to 
vulnerability.  A number of indicators have been used in the literature to measure supply 
risk. These include factors such as level of domestic reserves relative to consumption, 
domestic production relative to gas consumption, level of imports, diversification of 
supply sources, political risk in the supplying countries, and market liquidity.  The higher 
is the ratio of domestic reserves relative to consumption or domestic production relative 
to consumption, the lower is vulnerability. The same is true for lower level of imports 
means lower level of exposure to disruption.  These also indicate that dependence on 
domestically-sourced gas supply is preferred over imported gas, as it avoids geopolitical 
uncertainties. Diversification of supply sources, particularly politically stable supply 
sources also reduces the risk and vulnerability to disruption.  
 
For the principal component analysis, we have selected four market risk indicators and 
two supply risk indicators for the eight Asian gas-importing economies of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, China, India, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand for 2006. 
 
The selected market risk indicators are: 
• VGI/GDP (cost of imported gas in national income): This is measured as the ratio 
of value of gas imports to GDP. Its unit is in percentage. 
• GI (gas intensity): This is measured as the ratio of gas consumed in an economy 
to its GDP and expressed as cubic meter per unit of GDP or m3/GDP. 
• GC (gas consumption per capita): This is measured as the ratio of gas consumed 
in an economy to population and expressed as cubic meter per capita. 
• GS (gas share): It is expressed as the ratio of gas consumption to total primary 
energy consumption. Its unit is in percentage. 
 
The selected supply risk indicators are: 
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• DP/DC (domestic production relative to total domestic consumption): This is 
measured as the ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas 
consumption.1  
• GR (geopolitical risk): This represents the exposure of an economy to political 
risk and is measured on the basis of two factors: (1) diversification of gas import 
sources and (2) political stability in gas-exporting countries. ECN (2004) has 
suggested a methodology for quantifying such risk using the adjusted Shannon 




iii mmhS ln  (1) 
 where: 
 
S = Shannon index of import flows of gas, adjusted for political stability in 
exporting country i; 
hi = extent of political stability in country i (the exporting country), ranging from 
0 (extremely unstable) and 1 (extremely stable); and  
mi = share of gas imports from country i in total gas imports. 
 
 
Table 1. Volume and price of gas imports for selected Asian countries, 2006 
Country Gas import price 
($/MMBtu) 
Volume of gas imports 
(bcm) 
Japan 7.18 81.86 
Korea 8.75 34.14 
Taiwan 9.21 10.20 
China 3.20 1.00  
India 4.87 7.99  
Singapore 10.00 6.61 
Malaysia 2.59 2.53  
Thailand 3.07 8.98  
Source: For Japan and Korea average gas import price in 2006 was from International Energy Agency’s 
Energy Prices & Taxes Quarterly Statistics (2007b); For the rest of the countries, import price was 








                                                 
1 Domestic production is a better indicator of the importer’s capacity to cope with short–term supply 
disruption than domestic reserves as production excludes gas from stranded reserves which cannot be 
tapped immediately.  
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Table 2. Political risk rating of gas-producing countries (2006) 


















Trinidad & Tobago 41.3 
United Arab Emirates 65.9 
United States 57.7 
Source: World Bank, 2007, Worldwide Governance Indicators downloaded from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/; Political risk ratings range from 0 for high risk to 100 for 
low risk. 
 
The data on GDP and population in 2006 were taken from World Economic Outlook 
Database (IMF, 2007). Data for gas consumption and total primary energy consumption 
were sourced from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2007). The value of gas 
import for an economy is computed by multiplying its gas import with associated price 
found in literature and market reviews (Table 1).2 Data for domestic production, 
domestic consumption and trade movements were taken from BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy (2007). In this study, the percentile rank of an exporting country in the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for political stability in 2006 was used 
to determine hi (Table 2). 





2 It is important to note that there is no international price for natural gas and most trade is based on long–
term contracts. Hence, prices were based on the value of these contracts, where available. For Japan and 
Korea; average LNG import price in 2006 was from International Energy Agency’s Energy Prices & Taxes 
Quarterly Statistics (2007b). 
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4. Constructing GVI using PCA 
 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical approach that essentially 
transforms a set of correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated variables, termed 
components. The uncorrelated components are linear combinations of the original 
variables. PCA has in practice been used to reduce the dimensionality problems and to 
transform interdependent coordinates into significant and independent ones. The Nagar–
Basu methodology is used to estimate the gas vulnerability index (GVI). 
 
Gas vulnerability is regarded as a variable that can not be observed directly. The GVI is 
assumed to be linearly related with the selected four market risk indicators, two supply 
risk indicators and a disturbance term capturing error, represented by Equation (2):  
 
εββββββ ++++++= kkkkkkk XXXXXXGVI 665544332211  (2) 
 
where GVIk is the GVI of country k; X1k…X6k is the set of risk indicators corresponding 
to country k; and ε is the error term. The total variation in the GVI is composed of two 
orthogonal parts: variation due to selected risk indicators and variation due to error. The 
four market risk indicators are individually normalised and made positively related with 
gas vulnerability using Equation (3a). The two supply risk indicators which are 
negatively related to gas vulnerability are normalised using Equation (3b). 
 
( )







=           for VGI/GDP, GI, GC, GS (3a) 
 
( )







=           for DP/DC and GR (3b) 
 
The above adjustment transforms all the selected variables on the 0–1 scale. The value of 
0 is assigned to the country with the lowest value of the selected risk indicator and the 
value 1 is assigned to the country with the highest value of the selected indicator (Table 
3). 
 
Table 3. Normalised risk indicators 
Country DP/DC GR VGI/GDP GI GC GS 
Japan 0.97 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.42 0.23 
Korea 1.00 0.20 0.67 0.08 0.45 0.21 
Taiwan 0.85 0.65 0.55 0.05 0.33 0.13 
China 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
India 0.19 0.73 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.11 
Singapore 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.12 0.98 0.18 
Malaysia 0.05 1.00 0.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Thailand 0.28 1.00 0.27 0.51 0.29 0.57 
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A 6 X 6 correlation matrix R is calculated from the normalised indicators (Table 4). We 
then solve for the determinantal equation |R - λI| = 0 for λ. This provides a sixth degree 
polynomial equation in λ and hence six roots. These roots are the eigenvalues of 
correlation matrix R. Next, λ is arranged in descending order of magnitude, as λ1 > λ2 > λ3 
> λ4 > λ5 > λ6. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix R of normalised indicators 
Indicators DP/DC GR VGI/GDP GI GC GS 
DP/DC 1.000 -0.746 0.828 -0.508 0.300 -0.357 
GR -0.746 1.000 -0.287 0.517 0.041 0.329 
VGI/GDP 0.828 -0.287 1.000 -0.297 0.505 -0.241 
GI -0.508 0.517 -0.297 1.000 0.539 0.974 
GC 0.300 0.041 0.505 0.539 1.000 0.593 
GS -0.357 0.329 -0.241 0.974 0.593 1.000 
 
Corresponding to each value of λ, the matrix equation (R – λI)α = 0 is solved for the 6 x 1 
eigenvectors α, subject to the condition that α’α = 1 (normalisation condition). We then 
compute for the six principal components (PCs) by using the following: 
 




66 αkk xP = , 
 
where xk = [x1, x2,…x6] is a vector of normalised indicator for country k. 
 
The GVI is estimated as the weighted average of 6 principal components, where the 
weights are the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix R and it is known that  
λ1 = var (P1), λ2 = var (P2),… λ6 = var (P6) (5) 
 




















In a nutshell, the estimator of the GVI is computed as the weighted sum of the principal 
components, where weights are equal to variances of successive principal components. 








=  (7) 
Where k represents a country included in the study and then re-scaled the index value 
from 0 to 10 where 0 is the best performing state and 10 worst performing state in the 
sample of eight gas-importing countries in Asia. 
 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
 
The degree of vulnerability depends on many factors. One way to highlight the relative 
vulnerability of countries in our sample is to analyse individual indicators. Table 5 ranks 
countries in increasing order of vulnerability and provides the values of individual 
indicators for selected Asian countries.  
 
Ratio of value of gas imports to GDP (VGI/GDP). Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are 
relatively more vulnerable in terms of above average VGI/GDP ratios than the other 
countries in the sample. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are highly dependent on imports, 
with over 80 per cent of their gas requirements being sourced from overseas. Taiwan and 
Singapore, in particular, have very limited domestic gas resources.  
 
Table 5. Ranking of countries based on individual risk indicators (in ascending order of 
vulnerability) 
Market risk indicators Supply risk indicators 
VGI/GDP 
(%) 
GI (m3/$) GC 
(m3/capita) 















































































































Ratio of gas consumed to GDP or gas intensity (GI). Malaysia and Thailand have 
relatively above average gas intensities which makes them vulnerable to supply 
disruptions. Malaysia’s use of gas has increased twelve-fold among non-power 
consumers such as steel mills, small- and medium-scale industries and residential-
commercials sectors. Of the total gas consumption, 80 per cent is consumed by the power 
sector and the rest is used as fuel in the industrial sector and as feedstock for gas 
separation plants. Thailand has been self sufficient in gas supply for many years. 
However, since 1998 it has become a net gas importer despite the increasing production 
from its own fields and the development of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development 
Area. Thailand’s use of gas is not entirely for its power sector; it is also being used as a 
feedstock for gas separation plants, the products of which have resulted in less plastic 
imports and in export of petrochemical products (APERC, 2000). On the other hand, 
Japan and China are among the least vulnerable countries in terms of gas intensity as they 
greatly rely on oil and coal as primary energy sources. Japan is one of the least energy-
intensive countries due to the fact that Japanese energy costs are among the highest in the 
world. This has led the country's heavy industry, formerly a major energy consumer, to 
streamline its energy use. In addition, Japan has continued to shift away from energy-
intensive industries and has developed extensive energy efficiency programs.  
 
Ratio of gas consumed in an economy to population (GC). Malaysia and Singapore 
appear to be relatively vulnerable to supply disruption on the basis of their above average 
gas consumption per capita.  With a pipeline infrastructure in place, gas can be 
transported continuously to different consumers with ease which results in high gas 
consumption per capita. Peninsular Malaysia has a well-developed pipeline transmission 
system which has facilitated more domestic utilisation of natural gas in the industrial and 
residential-commercial sectors. Households benefit from the existence of pipelines as 
direct gas supply from a reticulation system to their homes. A similar situation exists in 
Singapore where gas demand by residential and commercial sectors is met through 
reticulation network. Gas is utilised for space cooling, water heating and cooking 
(APERC, 2000; APEC, 2006).     
 
Ratio of gas consumption to total primary energy consumption (GS). This indicator is 
closely related to GI and hence yields similar results. Malaysia and Thailand have above 
average shares of gas in total primary energy consumption which makes them relatively 
vulnerable. The large increase in the share of natural gas in energy demand is a direct 
result of Malaysia’s initiatives to cut down its high reliance on oil and oil products for 
electricity generation. Malaysia has increased its natural gas share of electricity 
production surpassing oil consumption. It has successfully transformed 60 per cent of its 
power plants to gas-fired, compared to 98 per cent oil-fired fifteen years ago and 
domestic consumption is for fuelling combined-cycle power plants. Similarly, Thailand 
has completely converted its oil-fired electric power plants to natural gas. In 2006, 
natural gas met almost 32 per cent of Thailand’s total primary energy demand, with much 
of it being used in generating electricity (APERC, 2008). 
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Ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas consumption (DP/DC). Singapore 
and Korea are the most vulnerable countries in our sample in terms of gas production to 
gas consumption ratio. Both countries have no domestic production of gas and rely 
entirely on imports for their natural gas requirements. Korea’s imports are in the form of 
LNG while Singapore imports through the Malaysian Peninsular Gas Utilisation (PGU) 
pipeline. 
 
Geopolitical risk (GR). Being largely determined by the degree of diversification of gas 
import sources and the associated political stability of these sources, it is expected that 
Japan is the least vulnerable country to geopolitical gas risk. Japan is the largest LNG 
importer in the world, sourcing its gas requirements from major suppliers such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Australia but other suppliers include Qatar, 
UAE, Oman, United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Egypt and Nigeria. It has the most 
diversified import sources among our sample countries. On the other hand, Malaysia, 
China and Thailand are equally the most vulnerable countries to geopolitical gas risk as 


























The analysis done so far is based on individual gas vulnerability indicators which is 
important to understand the relative positions of countries. However, it is also important 
to know how countries rank based on the aggregate GVI. The final values of GVI for our 
sample gas-importing countries in Asia are shown in Figure 1. Overall, Japan is the most 
vulnerable country with a gas vulnerability index of 10 while Malaysia is the least 
vulnerable country with GVI of 0.  
 
Japan is the most vulnerable among our sample countries whose consumption largely 
depends on imported gas due to its negligible domestic production and significant gas 
share in primary energy mix. In 2006, Japan imported more gas than the rest of the 
sample countries combined, at a relatively high import price. Malaysia is least vulnerable 
to gas risks as it could rely on domestic production to meet its gas requirements. Despite 
high geopolitical risk associated with having to import from one source (i.e., Indonesia), 
its minimal import volume purchased at a low import price exposes Malaysia to less 
market risk.3 Thailand is also relatively less vulnerable than the other sample countries 
but more vulnerable than Malaysia as it has some domestic gas production to meet its 
consumption, but significantly less than Malaysia’s. It also has one cross-border pipeline 
where supply of gas comes from Myanmar, a country considered to be politically 
unstable compared to Indonesia, Malaysia’s lone source of import.4 Thailand is also more 
exposed to market risk than Malaysia because the volume and price of its gas imports are 
significantly higher as seen in Table 1. The absence of domestic gas production makes 
Singapore relatively more vulnerable than Malaysia and Thailand. It is also exposed to 
market risk of having to import gas at a high import price. 
 
China is relatively less vulnerable than its northeast Asian neighbours because of its 
significant domestic gas production and small share of gas in its energy mix. Taiwan is 
more vulnerable than China because the volume and price of its gas imports are 
significantly higher. Taiwan imports ten times more gas than China and pays triple the 
price for its imports. In addition, the share of gas in primary energy mix in Taiwan is 
three times higher than in China. It is evident in the case of Korea that diversifying gas 
suppliers is not sufficient to prevent vulnerability. Despite Korea’s diversified import 
sources, it is relatively more vulnerable than India because the volume and price of its gas 
imports are significantly higher. Furthermore, Korean gas consumption per capita is 
almost twenty fold than that of India.5 
 
The analysis highlights inter-country differences with respect to individual and overall 
indicators of gas vulnerability. The GVI has different sensitivity to various individual 
indicators and as the principal component analysis confirmed, the ratio of value of gas 
imports to GDP (VGI/GDP) and ratio of domestic gas production to total domestic gas 
consumption (DP/DC) turned out to be more significant than the other indicators, in 
influencing the GVI results. This implies that policy measures which reduce gas 
vulnerability through diversification of gas supply sources, reduction in overall gas 
dependence by improving gas efficiency and diversifying energy mix, reduction in gas 
                                                 
3 Malaysia has the lowest import price (Table 1) and ranks 2nd in VGI/GDP (Table 5). 
4 See Table 2 
5 See Table 5 
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import demand especially at high import prices, and encouragement of investments in 
domestic gas exploration and production activities are relatively more important in 
addressing the problem of gas vulnerability.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Many factors determine gas vulnerability of an economy. Domestic production and 
volume of gas imports are very crucial in determining an economy’s vulnerability. 
Moreover, the import price of gas should also be one of the main considerations in the 
evaluation of gas vulnerability. If an economy can not rely on its domestic production 
then it should intensify its effort in supply diversification and procurement of affordable 
imports. As Percebois (2006) and Reymond (2007) summed it, a country which imports 
the majority of its gas at a sustainable cost and ensures the security of supply by well-





Andrews, C. (2005). “Reducing Energy Vulnerability’, in Weapons and Wires: 
Prevention and Safety in a Time of Fear, 2005 International Symposium on 
Technology and Society (ISTAS) Proceedings.  
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Secretariat (2006). Potential for Growth of 
Natural Gas as a Clean Energy Source in APEC Developing Economies, APEC 
Energy Working Group on Clean Fossil Energy, Singapore. 
 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (2008). APEC Energy Overview 2007, 
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 
 
_______ (2007). A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century: Resources and 
Constraints, Tthe Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 
 
_______ (2000). Natural Gas Pipeline Development in Southeast Asia, Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan. 
 
British Petroleum (BP) (2007). BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
(http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview). 
 
ECN (Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands) (2004). Designing Indicators of Long-
term Energy Supply Security. 
 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2008). Energy Profile of India, in 
Encyclopedia of Earth, (http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_India). 
 




_______ (2007b). Energy Profile of Taiwan, in Encyclopedia of Earth, 
(http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_Profile_of_Taiwan). 
 
_______ (2007c). Energy Profile of Thailand, in Encyclopedia of Earth, 
(http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_Profile_of_Thailand). 
 
_______ (2005). International Energy Outlook, U.S. Department of Energy: 37, 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat_gas.html). 
 
Gupta, E. (2008). “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-Importing Countries.” Energy Policy 
36:1195–1211. 
 
International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) (2007). “Natural Gas: is There a 
Decreasing Trend?” IAEE Newsletter 16(3).  
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007a). Natural Gas Market Review 2007: Security 
in a Globalising Market to 2015, OECD, Paris. 
 
_______ (2007b). Energy Prices & Taxes Quarterly Statistics (4th Quarter), OECD, 
Paris. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007). World Economic Outlook Database 
downloaded from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/ 
weodata/index.aspx. 
 
Komiyama, R., Zhidong, L. and Ito, K. (2005). “World Energy Outlook in 2020: 
Focusing on China's Energy Impacts on the World and Northeast Asia.” International 
Journal of Global Energy Issues 24 (3): 183-210. 
 
Nagar, A. L. and Basu, S.R. (2002). “Weighting Socio-Economic Indicators of Human 
Development: a Latent Variable Approach,” in A. Ullah, A. Wan, and A. Chaturvedi 
(eds), Handbook of Applied Econometrics and Statistical Inference. New York: 
Marcel Dekker. 
 
Percebois, J. (2006). “Dépendance et Vulnérabilité: Deux Façons Connexes Mais 
Différentes d’Aborder les Risques Energétiques.” Cahiers de recherché CREDEN 
06.03.64:17.  
 
Reymond, M. (2007). “European Key Issues Concerning Natural Gas: Dependence and 
Vulnerability.” Energy Policy 35: 4169-4176. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007). Overcoming Vulnerability to 





World Bank (2007). Worldwide Governance Indicators downloaded from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/. 
